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The UK has been asked to pay an extra £1.7 billion to the EU budget by 1 December following a
reassessment of the size of the British economy. Iain Beggwrites that while the issue has generated
an extremely hostile reaction from David Cameron, the data correction process used to arrive at the
figure is well-known to the UK authorities and the recalculation should not have come as a surprise.
He argues that Cameron’s approach to the EU is likely to provoke further disagreements, increasing
the prospects of a Brexit.
When David Cameron emerged from last Friday’s European Council meeting, the indignation on
show could not have been greater: ‘If people think I am paying that bill on 1 December, they have
another thing coming.’ He was responding to new figures revealed last week which call for an additional £1.7 billion
contribution to the EU budget from the UK. In what is a routine recalculation, several other countries, including the
Netherlands, have been asked to pay proportionately more than the UK, while Germany, France and 17 others will
pay less.
Is this as outrageous as the prime minister has asserted, or simply the normal application of EU rules and
mechanisms? In reality, it is a little bit of both, but there are three elements to the story.
The first is that most of the EU’s revenue derives from
an income stream known as the GNI (gross national
income) resource. GNI is a close relative of the more
familiar term GDP (gross domestic product), differing
largely because of how profits from abroad are counted.
As such, it reflects relative prosperity and, thus, ability to
pay – a widely accepted principle of taxation. The
amount called from each member state is a fixed
proportion of its GNI, though the true cost to the UK is
then attenuated by the famous rebate negotiated in
1984 by Margaret Thatcher. Despite some of the
headlines about a ‘tax on prosperity’, the principle that
countries pay more when GNI rises has been accepted
since the system was introduced over a quarter of a
century ago. In some years the UK has benefited, in
others it has had to pay, as have all other member
states.
Second, the GNI resource was something that British
negotiators pushed strongly for when it was first
introduced, and that the UK has fought to retain ever since. Others have argued for a tax to be assigned to the EU,
in much the same way as council tax in the UK or sales taxes in the United States are deemed to belong to the local
tier of government. But the UK, along with other net contributors to the EU budget, notably Germany, has been
adamant that there should be no such tax. The total amount called from the GNI resource is determined by the
spending from the EU budget and, in this regard, acts as a residual resource to ensure that the EU budget always
balances (as it is required to do by treaty). Spending is not entirely predictable because the rigorous controls which
countries like the UK insist that the EU impose have meant that some projects only become eligible to receive
funding much later than anticipated.
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The third consideration is that this year’s calculations are unusual, because the statisticians who construct the GNI
data recently completed a methodological review of how national accounts are compiled. These are once-in-a-
decade exercises, intended to reflect new insights into how income is generated and advances in data collection.
The results revealed that the UK, and a number of the others now being asked to pay more, have been
underestimating their prosperity. Normally this would not be that significant, but one of the new factors taken into
account is the scope of the hidden economy. In particular, new estimates have been made of the extent of the drug
and prostitution markets, something that Germany was apparently already doing.
These data corrections are well-known to the UK authorities and the spicier bits of the new methodology made the
news headlines over the summer. Nor is it a form of correction that the Treasury can plausibly claim not to have
expected. Indeed, in the late 1980s, Italy revalued its GDP and GNI substantially after introducing new ways of
estimating the size of its hidden economy. Overnight, Italy overtook the UK – known at the time as il sorpasso (the
over-taking) – but also reportedly drawing the retort from Thatcher that the Italians could henceforth pay more
towards the EU budget. Moreover, it is ingrained into Treasury officials that they should be alert to any statistical
manipulation that would increase GNI, precisely because of this sort of effect. Therefore, the prime minister is either
being disingenuous in claiming that the effects of the re-basing of GNI were unexpected, or he knew full well and
decided, nevertheless, to exploit it for immediate political purposes.
Other countries and the European Commission insist that the rules are clear and that Britain will have to pay,
implying little room for manoeuvre for the prime minister. Perhaps some fault will be discovered in the calculations,
allowing a more palatable figure to emerge. There is also a possibility that enough pressure will be brought to bear
on the net winners to persuade them to postpone or average out the introduction of the new GNI estimates, reducing
the amount the new net losers will have to pay this year. However, tax-payers in other countries will wonder why
their governments should agree to pay more to help the British prime minister mollify Eurosceptics at home.
Postponing the bills would also be tricky because the EU is legally banned from borrowing.
Leaving aside whether Cameron’s stance leaves wiggle-room to pay subsequently (though only after the Rochester
and Strood by-election), the new dispute is revealing about his approach to the EU. It follows his ill-judged campaign
to prevent Jean-Claude Juncker becoming president of the European Commission. Two conclusions can be drawn:
first, that not enough effort is made to understand how the EU functions or to form alliances to head off potential
trouble; and second, that there is too much of a tendency to shoot from the hip. This is a conjunction that can only
add to the prospects of further imbroglios and a growing probability of a Brexit.
Note: This article originally appeared at Chatham House and gives the views of the author, and not the position of
the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before
commenting.
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